Modern phenomenology, with its roots in Husserlian philosophy, has been taken up and utilised in a myriad of ways within different disciplines, but until recently has remained relatively under-used within sports studies. A corpus of sociological-phenomenological work is now beginning to develop in this domain, alongside a longer standing literature in feminist phenomenology. These specific social-phenomenological forms explore the situatedness of lived-body experience within a particular social structure. After providing a brief overview of key strands of phenomenology, this article considers some of the ways in which sociological, and particularly feminist phenomenology, might be used to analyse female sporting embodiment. For illustrative purposes, data from an autophenomenographic project on female distance running are also included, in order briefly to demonstrate the application of phenomenology within sociology, as both theoretical framework and methodological approach.
Introduction
Within sports studies, the woman in the sporting body has been studied from myriad theoretical angles over the past 30 years, including via a range of 'feminist prisms ' (e.g. Hall 1996; Wearing 1998 ). There remains, however, a relative lacuna in relation to embodied research on the lived experiences of the sporting body from a phenomenological perspective (Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007; Allen-Collinson 2009) . Wacquant (2004) highlights a need to conduct research not only of the body (as an object of study), but also from the body -using the body as a tool of inquiry. I argue here that using a form of 'sociologised' (see below) feminist phenomenology, can provide rigorous, grounded, and insightful analyses of female sporting embodiment, and effectively portray the complexities of sporting experiences -both cognitive and corporeal. Brief data from a research project on female distance running are included for illustrative purposes only. I should emphasize that, as a sociologist, I am working within the sociological-phenomenology tradition (Schutz 1967; Psathas 1973; Katz and Csordas 2003) rather than from a philosophical base. The openness of phenomenology to different readings has been noted as one of its strengths, with 'no place for phenomenological orthodoxy, or for so-called "purism"' (Mortari and Tarozzi 2010: 9) . I address here feminist-sociological phenomenology, although for ease of reading, I use the term feminist phenomenology (described below).
I am thus writing as a phenomenologically-inspired sociologist.
The interaction between phenomenology and feminism has furnished powerful analytic insights (de Beauvoir 1972; Fisher 2000) . This paper considers some of the possibilities offered by this nexus, which at times gives rise to scepticism and disquiet on both 'sides', but also generates potent insights in examining female experience as lived and felt in the flesh (Young 1998) . The philosophical phenomenological quest to seek out 'essences', the essential structures of experience (see below), has sometimes been understood as some form of essentialist quest for universal experience, neglectful of the specificities of biological sex, and of gender and other forms of social-structural 'situatededness'. As I consider below, feminist phenomenology addresseses such criticisms head-on by acknowledging the powerful influences and constraints of social structure upon lived experience, and the corporeal specifics of bodies that are located in time and culture.
To date, studies of sporting experience employing a phenomenological theoretical framework remain relatively under-developed (Kerry and Armour 2000; Allen-Collinson 2009) , although a literature is gradually developing. The following studies provide just a flavour of this oeuvre, drawing primarily upon existential phenomenology, particularly
Merleau-Ponty's work on the body as subject of perception. Masciotra et al. (2001) , for example, provide a detailed, phenomenologically-grounded account of spatio-temporal distancing and co-ordination in Karate, whilst Bar-on Cohen (2006) addresses 'somatic codes' (words verbalising interior body dynamics) and pedagogy in Karate training. The dialectical relationship between 'player-body-subject' and the lived-space of the playing field is observed in football/ soccer by Hughson and Inglis (2002) and Hemphill (2005) .
For those researching mind-body practices and physical cultures, Merleau-Ponty has proved a fertile source. Samudra (2008) portrays kinaesthetic experiences in Silat Bangau Putih, a Chinese-Indonesian self-defense and health system. Morley (2001) examines yoga practice utilising Merleau-Pontian constructs and drawing comparisons between the practice of yoga and phenomenology itself, including epochē/bracketing (see below). Addressing sports and physical activity more generally, Hockey and AllenCollinson (2007) explore the sensory dimension of the sporting body, applying Merleau-
The article is structured as follows. First, for those unfamiliar with the tenets of phenomenology, a basic overview is provided, before moving to sociologicalphenomenology and feminist phenomenology respectively. Phenomenology is used variously as epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and method (Mortari and Tarozzi 2010) and sometimes as a combination of all these. An overview of the phenomenological method is therefore also given. Briefly to illustrate its application as method, I then describe an autophenomenographic research project on female middle/long-distance running.
The multiple strands of phenomenology
Different ontological and epistemological positions underlie the many and complex strands of the 'tangled web of phenomenology' (Ehrich 1999: 20) and here I can only touch upon this complex, protean and nuanced perspective (see Allen-Collinson, 2009 , for a recent overview in relation to sports studies). Inevitably, much of the richness and complexity is lost in such a brief resumé, and as Spiegelberg (1982) Husserl's (1983 Husserl's ( [1913 ) Ideas and subsequent work. As Embree and Mohanty (1977) indicate, constitutive phenomenology relates broadly to the notion that we are simultaneously in and part of the world into which we are born. This strand is transcendental in seeking to transcend our framework of everyday, tacit presuppositions and taken-for-granted assumptions about phenomena -including 'scientific' assumptions, interpretations and abstractions. Husserl's idealist transcendental phenomenology aimed to develop a method to yield absolute essential knowledge or universal laws of facts (Jennings 1986 (Jennings : 1235 also the bracketing of oneself from the 'natural world' via the transcendental reduction, in order to attain a pure transcendental consciousness. The notion of 'transcendental subjectivity' was interpreted by some as unattainably idealistic and thus subjected to mordant critique, leading Husserl to refocus his later work toward the development of a theory of intersubjectivity using the concept of the Lebenswelt -the commonsense lifeworld of everyday experience; a conception that stimulated much sociological interest.
Alfred Schutz (1967 Schutz ( , 1973 , for example, synthesized aspects of Husserl's concept of the life-world to create a phenomenological sociology or sociological phenomenology (Wagner 1973 ) (see below), and inspired the radical thinking of Harold Garfinkel (1984) , the originator of ethnomethodology.
In recent times, Giorgi (1985) Importantly too, for sociological-phenomenology, existentialist phenomenology highlights the situatedness of human experience, including gendered experience and behaviour (de Beauvoir 1974; Young 1980 ).
Sociological and feminist phenomenology
Husserl's phenomenology was first applied extensively within North American sociology by Alfred Schutz, whose work was initially considered as phenomenological psychology given its focus upon inner, subjective experience. Subsequently, Schutz's (1967 Schutz's ( , 1973 attention turned toward the Husserlian conception of the life-world (Lebenswelt). He adapted and synthesized aspects of Husserl's thinking with Max Weber's theory of Verstehen and social action to create a phenomenological-sociology or sociologicalphenomenology (Wagner 1973) , and his sociological interest was particularly sparked by
Husserl's investigations into intersubjective communities. As Liberman (2009: 149) notes, Husserl's work on 'intersubjective constitution' generally was taken up enthusiastically by researchers in sociology. Another key perspective in sociologicalphenomenological thinking developed from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and the systematic denial of the role of the body (e.g. Grosz 1994 ). But feminists have also levelled trenchant criticisms at forms of 'traditional phenomenology' (Fisher 2000) for insufficient recognition of, and analytic attention to 'difference', including differences of sex, gender and sexuality, and importantly for assuming that 'male equals universal'.
Butler (2006) which is then open to application to experiential specificities, such as those of women.
In relation to female embodiment, feminist phenomenology is well-placed to provide a powerful analysis of women's lived-body experience as both biologically specific, and also situated within a particular historical social structure. Sociological-phenomenology and feminist phenomenology thus add a powerful additional analytic element to more 'traditional' phenomenology in explicitly acknowledging and theorising the historically-specific, social-structurally elements of human experience and embodiment, and the specifics of bodies that are gendered, 'raced', aged, with varying degrees of dis/ability, and so on. Sociological-phenomenology sharpens the focus upon our corporeal embeddedness within cultural and social worlds.
In this vein, Csordas' (2002: 244) concept of 'somatic modes of attention' is apposite to sociological-phenomenological research on sporting embodiment in its focus upon the 'culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others'. I now consider: i) the application of phenomenology in studies of sport and physical cultures; and ii) the principles of the phenomenological method.
Phenomenology and sporting embodiment
To illustrate phenomenology's distinctiveness in portraying sporting experience, an exemplar drawn from Kerry and Armour (2000: 3-4 ) is helpful. Employing the example of glycogen depletion or 'hitting the wall' in distance running, the authors contrast a phenomenological and a physiological approach, where the latter seeks to hold constant certain variables whilst manipulating others in order to ascertain whether some distinctive, 'objective' bodily process is occurring. Phenomenologists, in contrast, endeavour to capture as far as possible the subjective experience and meaning of hitting the wall, irrespective of whether 'the wall' exists in any 'objective', physiological, cellular sense. Phenomenology has long been concerned with embodiment issues, and with experiences and meanings of sport, exercise and movement (Arnold 1979) . Given his interest in embodied consciousness, perception, intentionality (see below), and the ways in which we experience lived time-space, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has been utilised to great effect in the phenomenological analysis of various sports and physical cultures, as highlighted above.
In relation to embodiment and the development of sporting skills and capabilities, drawing on Merleau-Pontian perspectives, Crossley (2001: 123) portrays the corporeal schema as: 'an incorporated bodily know-how and practical sense; a perspectival grasp upon the world from the "point of view" of the body'. For sportspeople, such corporeal know-how is developed via socialisation into specific training practices, so that the sporting 'habit-body' requires not only a cognitive understanding of its tasks, but also develops corporeally embedded knowledge and memory. Crossley (2001) distinguishes between what we might conceptualise as two 'layers': that of the 'habit-body' and that of the 'body-at-this-moment'. The habit-body transcends the immediate ground of spontaneous sensation of the-body-at-this-moment, absorbed in its immediate environment, and persists over time, allowing us to perceive the world around. The embodied knowledge and memory of the sporting habit-body are developed and become sedimented over time via habitual, everyday training practices, as portrayed for example in rugby (Pringle 2009 ), cricket (Sutton 2007) , boxing (Wacquant 2004) , and martial arts (Samudra 2008) . Phenomenology elucidates the ways in which the development of such skill and expertise requires sports participants to move beyond the cognitive, to develop a seemingly 'natural', pre-reflective, embodied response to situations. Interestingly too, the very lack of such 'naturalness' has been highlighted by phenomenological writers. Preston (1996) addresses what we might term the 'non-habit body', using Young's (1998) example of some women's lack of habituation in relation to athletic practices.
'Throwing like a girl' is thus viewed not so much as a property of 'like-a-girlness' but rather about engaging in unfamiliar, non-habitual practices.
In general then, how might phenomenologically-inspired sociological researchers 
Notes on the phenomenological method and autophenomenography
In general, phenomenologically-inspired researchers within the social sciences assemble highly detailed, in-depth descriptions of subjective experience in specific contexts, and seek to identify their 'essences' (described below); the essential, but (for sociologicalphenomenologists in particular) always situated patterns or 'structures' of experience as they appear to consciousness. Although the different strands of phenomenology have their own distinctive principles and perspectives, four themes or qualities, derived from Husserlian phenomenology, provide a touchstone in portraying 'the phenomenologcal method'. This, it should be emphasized, is not method in terms of a set of specific research techniques or procedures, but much more: an encompassing attitude, a whole orientation to the world, requiring, as van Manen (2000) advocates, a certain attentive awareness to the things of the world as we live them rather than as we more abstractly theorize them. We might describe the phenomenological method as an attitude of wonderment, an attempt to see the world through fresh, 'naive' eyes. Any tight prescription of method(s) would run counter to the openness of this phenomenological enterprise. Indeed, a whole range of methods-related questions is regularly discussed and debated intra and inter the strands of phenomenology (see Finlay 2009) . A brief explanation of the four characteristics provides context for those unfamiliar with this methodological approach: 1) description; 2) epochē and reduction; 3) essences; and 4) intentionality.
1) Description
Given the centrality of the inter-relationship between the perceiver's consciousness and perceived objects, phenomenological description is never viewed merely as the 'abstract' writing or recording of things without reference to the perceiver/researcher.
Description, however, can mean very different things for phenomenologists of different traditions. For hermeneutic phenomenologists and indeed for most sociologicalphenomenologists, there is no description without interpretation, for any description provides: 'not a copy of the world, but a hermeneutics' (Spurling, 1977: 168) . Forms of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, aspire to describe a phenomenon by suspending as far as possible prior knowledge, assumptions, attitudes and interpretations enveloping it, in order to arrive at its essential core meanings. This is undertaken via the processes of epochē and reduction.
2) Epochē and reduction
These concepts have been subject to intense contestation and Husserl himself never precisely defined what these processes were; phenomenological researchers employ the terms in a plethora of ways (Gearing 2004) . The notion of 'epochē', from the Greek to abstain, stop, or keep a distance from, dates back to the ancient Skeptics and was used by Husserl to denote the attempt to suspend all taken-for-granted assumptions and presuppositions about a phenomenon. The skeptical epochē is a process, 'which places in question all [the philosopher's] hitherto existing convictions, which forbids in advance any judgmental use of them, forbids taking any position as to their validity or invalidity' (Husserl 1970: 76) . It is thus the suspending or temporary bracketing 3 of the 'natural attitude', our taken-for-granted, everyday assumptions about a phenomenon, including 'scientific' abstractions, in order to arrive at and describe its essential characteristics, to be faithful to the thing itself.
For Husserl, once the natural attitude has been suspended via the first stage of epochē, eidetic reduction was used to make sense of what remained, to reduce the phenomenon to an exemplar of an essence or an eidos. This, for him, required a further level of reduction, the transcendental reduction to the 'absolutely unique, ultimately functioning ego' (Husserl 1970: 186) , and thus to transcendental subjectivity. For sociological-phenomenological researchers, we depart from Husserl's thinking at this point, for complete bracketing of the socio-cultural situatedness of our descriptions and understandings is acknowledged to be an impossibility; we cannot stand outside our cultural frame of reference (including our language structures). What is useful to us, however, is the exhortation to make best efforts reflexively and systematically to be aware of our assumptions and standpoints, and to render these explicit. In sports studies for instance, it is possible to take the descriptions provided by participants themselves and subject these to analysis by bracketing as far as possible our prior assumptions regarding the phenomenon, for example by making the familiar strange, explicitly recording and critically questioning our own conceptualisations of the phenomenon, or using researcher triangulation. Methods of bracketing utilised in a recent research project on women's running are considered below.
3) Essences
The purpose of Husserl's phenomenological reduction is to distil a phenomenon, to reduce it to its eidos, devoid of the usual tacit, taken-for-granted assumptions enveloping it. For Husserl (1970) , a central aim of phenomenology was the discovery of the essential patterns or structures of an experience, in order to create a systematic and disciplined methodology for the derivation of knowledge. But, as Ehrich (1999: 23) emphasizes, for later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, arriving at such description is not the culmination, but merely a starting point in seeking to understand the experience. The concept of 'essences' has been widely debated, particularly in relation to notions of universality and the independence of essences from social context. For sociologicalphenomenologists, the emphasis is on the situatedness of experience so that essences are acknowledged to be socially constituted, culture-and context-bound. For us, the essence coheres around the recognition of generalities in the phenomenon, rather than making a definitive statement about its invariance.
4) Intentionality
Intentionality is the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something; it is thus intentional, orientated towards something/someone. As Willig (2008: 52) neatly phrases it: 'Intentionality allows objects to appear as phenomena', and explains why different people experience the 'same' thing in sometimes radically different ways. So, if whilst out running I think I see a snake in the grass, then I have a 'snake-in-the-grass' experience, whether or not the snake is actually 'real'. Merleau-Ponty (2001) distinguishes between two kinds of intentionality: intentionality of acts, when we consciously and voluntarily take up a position; and operative intentionality, a kind of prereflective intentionality, a background-noise setting to our lives, only brought to light via the reduction (see Reuter, 1999 for a concise explanation). Whilst Husserl focussed upon the intentionality of mind, Merleau-Ponty (2001) highlights bodily intentionality -the body as an attitude directed toward an existing or potential task. For him, intentionality, perception and action are fundamentally intertwined; all elements apposite to sociological-phenomenological analyses of sporting experiences.
These, then, are four key elements in the Husserlian phenomenological method, subsequently developed and revised within different forms of phenomenology. For many sociological-phenomenologists, any research method able to generate detailed descriptions of participants' concrete lived experiences of a phenomenon, can provide data for the application of phenomenologically-inspired analysis. Phenomenological researchers in the social sciences have, however, sometimes found themselves subject to criticism for non-participation in the phenomenon/a under study, as Gruppetta (2004) points out. Although a phenomenological researcher's use of second-hand accounts need not necessarily be construed as a weakness of method, autoethnographic phenomenology or 'autophenomenography' provides an interesting avenue for addressing such criticism.
Gruppetta (2004) Autophenomenography is thus an autobiographical genre in which the phenomenological researcher is both researcher and participant in her/study of a particular phenomenon, subjecting her/his own lived experience to sustained and rigorous phenomenological analysis (Allen-Collinson 2011). Here it should be noted that I choose the term 'autophenomenography' rather than 'autophenomenology' for two reasons. First, as with ethnography and its offspring, autoethnography, 'graphy' is taken to delineate the research process as well as the written or other representational product of that process.
Second, autophenomenology has specific -and contestedmeanings within phenomenology (see for example , Drummond 2007; Marbach 2007) and there is not the scope here to delve into these debates. Briefly to 'ground' the article with some data, I
include below details of a recent autophenomenographic research project on female distance running.
The Research
To contextualise the research, whilst falling firmly within the non-élite category, I am highly committed, a 'serious runner' whose running encompasses two of Bale's (2004) forms: 1) welfare running, pursued for health and fitness aims; and also 2) performance running, pursued in order to improve and sustain performance. Although 'performance'
is usually employed in relation to élite athletes, elements can usefully be applied to 'serious runners ', who: 'regularly [run] further and faster than fitness for health would demand' (Smith 2000: 190) .
As part of an autophenomenographic project on middle/long-distance running, I maintained a research log for a period of 2.5 years (ongoing), which includes highly detailed descriptions of my subjective and corporeal experiences during training sessions.
The research adheres to Giorgi's (1985 Giorgi's ( , 1997 descriptive, empiricalphenomenological guidelines, and includes the following elements: i) the collection of concrete descriptions of phenomena from an 'insider' perspective; ii) the adoption of the phenomenological attitude; iii) initial impressionistic readings of the descriptions to gain a feel for the whole; iv) in-depth re-reading of these descriptions as part of a process of data-immersion, to identify themes and sub-themes; and v) the production of accounts of the essential structure(s) of the experiences. Given the ideographic nature of the research, I depart at this juncture from Giorgi's method with regard to constructing general descriptions across a range of participants. Instead, the focus is upon my own lived experiences of a phenomenon.
A 23-year career in running gives me some confidence of fulfilling Garfinkel's (2002) phenomenologically-derived 'unique adequacy requirement' for the analyst to be familiar with the phenomenon. This requirement of familiarity can, however, render problematic another key element of the phenomenological method, epochē, thus requiring heightened reflexivity of the 'insider' researcher. In order to bracket (in a sociological-phenomenological sense) my own preconceptions about female running in public space, I engaged in two bracketing practices to make the familiar strange: 1) discussions with both insiders and non-insiders to the distance-running subculture, female and male; 2) in-depth reading of ethnographic accounts of other sporting activities in order to compare and contrast the key elements of these with the running experience. Whilst straying from Husserl's idealistic notion of epochē, this process did challenge my 'fore-conceptions' and increase reflexivity by identifying many tacit assumptions. I now portray an instance from the data, which demonstrates feministphenomenological analysis of a lived experience of danger.
As context, the majority of my training currently takes place as a solo female runner in public space. Feminist writers have long identified the gendered nature of space, including the dangers to women moving in and through 'public' space (e.g.
Valentine 1989
). My running in public space is thus lived and felt at the individual, subjective level, but is also deeply structurally-shaped by my difficulty, as a woman, in securing 'an undisputed right' to occupy that space (Hanmer and Saunders 1984) .
Running in public space can render women -and men also -vulnerable to verbal and physical harassment, even assault, and there appears to be a strongly gendered element to this harassment (Smith 2000) .
Over the years, I have been subject to varying degrees of verbal and physical harassment; men/teenage boys have lunged and grabbed at various parts of my anatomy. The embodied consequences of such abuse and attack mean that at times when corporeal vulnerability is brought forcibly to the forefront of my consciousness, I
run warily, eyes and ears on full alert, breath at times shallow so that I can better listen for sounds. My running body is no longer the running habit-body, at ease with itself and the environment, but is brought vividly and jarringly to consciousness. My bodily intentionality is also redirected from other important running elements, such as the terrain underfoot, 'obstacles' such as pedestrians and cars, to potential or actual attackers. A log entry testifies to some key phenomenological elements: intentionality, the mind-body nexus, and problems of bracketing, in relation to an incident that turned out to be relatively innocuous, but due to my intentionality was initially experienced as highly threatening.
Phew, strange run tonight. Out along the river meadows quite some way from the city and approaching the weir. Suddenly out of the blue, a red pick-up truck is hurtling its way across the field towards me down the track toward the river. I had spotted the truck previously careering across the fields, but within sight and earshot of dog-walkers and others, I had paid it little heed. Now there is no one in sight, and the houses bordering the river are some way off on the other bank. Is that a shot gun sticking out of the open passenger window? I catch male voices drifting toward me on the evening air. Heart pounding in my ears now -quiet, quiet, I order -I need to be able to hear and think. Try to steady breathing, better to concentrate. The truck is still approaching down the grassy track, bumping and swaying. I up the pace, pull down my baseball hat firmly and set my jaw sternly. I will my body harder, leaner, tauter, try to look focussed and 'don't mess with me'. Not for the first time, I wish my slight, 5'3" runner's body were somewhat more imposing.
Suddenly breath-catchingly, the truck veers off the track a few metres in front of me. I hear loud male voices and a radio blaring. Heart still pounding out time. Just in case, as I up the pace to get out of the danger zone, I tack from side to side… in order to make myself a more difficult target.
Via sociological-phenomenological bracketing of my long experience of similar encounters resulting in verbal or physical harassment, the above response appears bizarre, unfounded and melodramatic. On the basis of experience, however, I cannot discount 24 years' running, and many more of being a woman moving in and through public space, which have honed my habit-body/mind. The challenges of attempting epochē are forcibly brought home to me.
Concluding -not conclusive -thoughts
In this article, I have explored just some of the possibilities offered by sociologicalphenomenology for researching lived sporting-body experiences, and by feminist phenomenology for examining female sporting embodiment specifically. Commensurate with the phenomenological tradition, which emphasizes the incompleteness of all knowledge and understanding, I must emphasize that this account is of course very partial -because of my own specific characteristics (gender, age, socio-cultural location, ability etc), and because we can never capture or convey fully the essential structures of lived experience. We can only try our best to engage in the 'breathing of meaning ' (van Manen 2000) and to share our lived experience. Likewise, feminist phenomenology provides just one of a myriad of different ways to research and represent women's sporting experience and embodiment. Importantly too, it is explicit about its standpoint and partialness. It seeks to generate accounts that locate the specifics of individual experience within broader social structures, including the gender order.
Sociological-phenomenology can provide not only a strong theoretical and methodological framework for examining human subjectivity and embodiment in general, but allied to feminism is particularly well-suited to the analytic task of charting women's lived-body sporting experiences and the specifics of socially-relating, gendered bodies within a particular social structure. In common with any theoretical and methodological approach, there are of course limitations, but feminist phenomenology's insistence on taking seriously, and remaining faithful to the phenomena portrayed in women's own experiential accounts, grounded in both the material-corporeal body and in a wider social-structural framework, provides a potent analytic framework. This form of phenomenology encourages reflection upon, and empathic understanding of, how it feels to be the woman in the lived sporting body; a body that is also, as sociology emphasizes, inscribed and imbued with socio-cultural meanings, significances, purposes and interests.
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